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Guidelines for a critical 
company problem 
C. Merle Crawford is a faculty member  at the University o f  
Michigan. 
In spite o f  much evidence o f  its success, many 
managers hesitate to establish a policy for  
new product  development.  Their indecision 
often arises f rom two reasons: they fear that a 
defined strategy may discourage innovation 
and they are uncertain how to formulate a 
new product  strategy. The author o f  this 
article discredits the former  notion and, in 
reply to the latter, proposes the guidelines for  
developing such a statement. As new products 
are essential to the continued success o f  most  
firms, the strategy must exist and must  be 
operant i f  the f irm is to avoid wasted time, 
effort, and money as well as employee con- 
fusion and discouragement. 
For longer than most of us care to remember,  
Dan Gerber has been proclaiming that babies 
are his business, his only business. With some 
nostalgic regret I read recently that he has 
altered his strategy: he now permits limited 
diversification beyond  products for babies. 
A leading toiletries manufacturer has an 
equally tenacious, though unpublicized, 
commitment  to only those new, nonfood,  
packaged goods that do not compete item- 
to-item with Procter and Gamble. 
Richard Rifenburgh, president of Mohawk 
Data Sciences, manufacturers of peripheral 
computer  equipment,  was cited recently in 
Fortune as a man who, at the present time, 
would rather be an agile follower than a 
creative leader. 1 On the assumption that it 
would be too expensive to develop frontiers, 
Rifenburgh prefers to wait to see on which 
newly opened trails the volume of activity 
will fall. 
All of these companies have a powerful 
managerial t o o l - w h a t  I call a New Product 
Development Strategy Statement. They have 
formed convictions concerning new products 
that seem most appropriate for their respec- 
tive firms. Under vigorous leadership, their 
policies are being implemented. 
Contrast the clarity of  these approaches 
with the following charge given to a product  
development group : 
. . .  to take  the  lead in mee t ing  the  needs  of  the 
c o m p a n y ' s  cus tomers  for improved  and new 
produc t s ,  to develop new uses for  exis t ing p roduc t s ,  
and  to develop h igh-prof i t  p roduc t s  for  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
to exis t ing and  po t en t i a l  cus tomers .  
Research directors who labor under 
guidance like this are the ones who lament the 
lack of vision of marketing and top manage- 
ment personnel: the top brass can't recognize 
a good product  idea when it is shown to 
them. Research operations which "benef i t"  
from the most liberal guidelines also endure 
1. Dan Cordtz, "Bringing the Laboratory Down to 
Earth," Fortune (January 1971 ), p. 106. 
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the most idea rejection, development diffi- 
culties, and product  failure. 
Specifically, does the statement of that 
company limit the search to improving or 
extending the present product line? What 
degree of relationship to the present scope of 
activity is necessary for the idea to be 
acceptable? May the search proceed into 
unrelated areas? Is search limited to the firm's 
present technological capabilities, distribution 
system, raw materials, and plant and human 
resources? Is the door to acquisition open or 
dosed? Will functional capability be added to 
match each new idea, or should the ideas 
match present functional capabilities? 
The idea of putting definitive restrictions 
on the new product  activity is not  novel, but  
use of it, especially sophisticated use, is still 
not  widespread. Most large firms have some- 
thing they call new product  strategy but  it is 
more for directors and stockholders than for 
serious internal direction; other firms have 
sketches of such strategy but  they are rarely 
available for personnel down the line from the 
president's office. As the president of  a 
medium-sized firm recently said to me, not 
entirely in jest: "Sure, we have a new product  
strategy; just ask me!"  
Early in this century General Motors 
commit ted itself to a full line of automobiles, 
a strategy that proved superior to Ford's. 
Only recently did Coca-Cola abandon its 
strategy of no line additions. General 
Electric's approach, a broad attack upon 
markets susceptible to electrical technology, 
is decades old. 
Indeed, new product strategies are so old, 
and in so many cases credited with such 
successful outcomes, that  one is prompted to 
ask why all firms don ' t  have them. There are 
essentially two reasons: 
1. M a n a g e m e n t  is n o t  ce r ta in  w h a t  such s ta te-  
m e n t s  shou ld  cover.  
2. M a n a g e m e n t  fears t h a t  l imi ta t ions  m a y  
discourage some useful  or  s u c c e s s f u l  inno-  
va t ion .  
These are the points to which we will now 
turn our attention. 
WHAT SHOULD THE STATEMENT 
INCLUDE? 
The basic purpose of new product  strategy is 
to provide unifying direction. It specifically 
notes any tempting development areas that 
are off limits; it clearly specifies those areas 
where effort is to proceed; and it adds any 
other direction appropriate and relevant to 
the firm, as in the Mohawk strategy. 
• A review of representative strategy state- 
ments reveals how the following dimensions 
are in actual use. 
Technology/Market Mix 
As long ago as 1957, the Harvard Business 
Review ran an article by  Samuel C. Johnson 
of S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. and Conrad 
Jones of Booz, Allen & Hamilton which 
became a classic because it spelled out  what 
was rapidly gaining fame as the BA/H method 
of organizing the new product  function. 2 The 
article contained a table which should be on 
page one of every firm's planning document .  
It diagramed the alternatives available for new 
product  activity as a 3x3 matrix (see 
accompanying table). 
This table structurally depicts the possible 
nine combinations of  market  and technology. 
Some, all, or none of these may be encour- 
aged, as the applicability of each of the 
options will vary from firm to firm. Unless it 
values new and improved products for their 
own sake, any management will want to study 
thoroughly the various cost/return relation- 
ships and stipulate those which it wants to 
stress and those it wishes to avoid. 
Market Width 
The bo t tom row of the matrix, New Market, 
provides the third dimension into the consid- 
2. Samuel (2. Johnson, "How to Organize for New 
Products," Harvard Business Review (May-June 1957), pp. 
49-62. 
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No Market  No 
Change Act iv i ty  Reformula t ion  Replacement  
St rengthened Improved  Line 
Market  Remerchandis ing Product  Extens ion  
New New Market  
Market  Use Extens ion Diversification 
SOURCE: Samuel C. Johnson and Conrad Jones, "How 
Products," Harvard Business Review (May-June, 1957), p. 52. 
erations the table does not  include. There are 
the categories of industrial, institutional, and 
consumer, of domestic and foreign, and of 
specific product  use categories, such as deter- 
gents, shoes, boats.  
If  a company has any new product  
strategy, it usually covers this dimension 
fairly well. Most industrial firms feel at home 
in institutional markets bu t  avoid consumer 
products (if not  at first, then several expen- 
sive exercises later). Involvement in foreign 
markets is usually deliberate and, in most 
situations, so is choosing broad product  
categories. When the United Shoe Machinery 
Corporation decided to move into other lines, 
all concerned personnel knew it. 
But this shouldn't  imply for a second that 
strate~es score well on this dimension. In 
fact, you can usually start an argument by  
asking two executives of the same firm if their 
firm is at tempting to move into closely allied 
markets or product  types which it is not  now 
in. Is the manufacturer of  drugs for human 
use willing to enter the veterinary market? 
Should the soup company market snacks? 
Two years ago Lyle H. Polsfuss, then vice 
president of  marketing for Green Giant 
Company,  stated that his top management 
(including the chairman) had delineated the 
specific spheres of interest within which new 
product  activity would proceed. 3 The fact 
3. In a speech, as reported in Advertising Age, 
(September 1, 1969), p. 51. 
to Organize for New 
that a team was developed for each sphere 
emphasizes the positiveness as well as the 
restrictiveness of the strategy. 
Degree of I nnovation/I rnitation 
This is the third and last dimension on which 
most  managements have made commitments ,  
not  because strategic direction is consciously 
desired so much as because innovative 
research requires different scientific staffs. 
Thus the product  development staff at 
Mohawk Data Sciences is clearly directed to 
taking someone else's new technology and 
improving, or at least individualizing, it in 
some way. In contrast, the Cabot Corporation 
is thoroughly commit ted  to innovation and 
takes in fifty times as much money from 
licensing processes as it pays out. 4 
Examples of both approaches can be 
found in Theodore Levitt 's "Innovative 
Imitat ion,"  an article in which the world's 
leading opponent  of  myopic marketing 
vigorously pleads for the option of imitation, 
though it too requires thoughtful  develop- 
ment as well as faithful executions, s 
If  a management wants to assume the 
high-risk/pay-off character of innovative 
4. Cordtz, "Bringing the Laboratory," p. 108. 
5. Theodore Levitt, "Innovative Imitation," Harvard 
Business Review (September-October, 1966), pp. 63-70. 
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development,  all persons in positions to 
influence company activities should know it. 
This applies to imitation as well, or to any 
blend of  the two. 
Actually it may be more complicated than 
a simple innovation/imitation choice. Igor 
Ansoff  and John  Steward recently spelled out  
a four-point  scale of  orientation: 
1. First to market . . ,  based o n  s t r o n g  R & D, 
technical leadership, and risk taking. 
2. Follow the leader.. ,  based on strong develop- 
ment r e s o u r c e s  a n d  the ability t o  ac t  quickly 
as the market starts its growth phase. 
3. Applications engineering.., based on product 
modification to fit the needs of particular 
c u s t o m e r s  in  m a t u r e  markets. 
4. Me-Too...  based on superior manufacturing 
efficiency and cost control. 6 
Price/Quality Ranges 
From this point  forward in the consider- 
ations, the various dimensions are optional in 
the sense that any one firm may or may not  
find them desirable. Position on the list 
(whether here or near the end) carries no 
implications. 
The Campbell Soup Company has an 
outstanding reputation, and cares not  to lose 
it. No surprise then that Campbell 's product  
development people are told: "Prepare and 
market  products that represent superior 
values to consumers and constantly improve 
those values. Our products  are sound values 
because they are made from superior quality 
ingredients . . . .  " Value can come from either 
quality or price bu t  Campbell people know 
which route they are to take. 7 
In contrast, many firms take the opposite 
tack. Small appliances purchased in the chain 
drugstores, for instance, seem to come from 
manufacturers whose position is far to the 
right on the quality/price spectrum. 
6. Igor Ansoff and John Steward, "Strategies for a 
Technology-Based Business," Harvard Business Review 
(November-December, 1967), pp. 71-83. 
7. Speech by John W. Dodd, Jr., Sixth Annual New 
Products Marketing Conference, Detroit, Mich., March, 1966. 
The strategy statement of  a large pharma- 
ceutical firm contains the expression: "New 
products must enhance the company's  
stature." It goes on to clarify this b y  pointing 
out, among other things, the need to restrict 
the number  of  products that are modified 
copies of ones already on the market  for 
which low price would be a primary or 
tempting strategy. 
Particular Promotional Requirements 
The range of  options here is limited only b y  
the diversity of  marketing tools, bu t  it is 
customary for marketing people to orient to 
those new products which match current 
promotional  strategy or marketing resource 
structure. Jus t  as commonly ,  R & D people 
do no t -un less  they are told. 
Several years ago, researchers in Wallace 
Laboratories were seeking new drug products 
which could be  sold b y  advertising, since, in 
contrast to every other firm of significance in 
the industry, Wallace had no sales force. 
Procter & Gamble wants products where 
brand manager skills-advertising, packaging, 
p romot ions -can  be the deciding factor. 
Until Metrecal forced a change, Mead 
Johnson  sought only products  which could be 
promoted  ethically through the professional 
health team rather than as proprietaries on 
television. 
A certain mini-conglomerate which holds 
a major interest in radio stations wants only 
those products which can be effectively adver- 
tised on radio. Still other firms want products 
which (1) can be  sold through mass merchan- 
disers where the company is strong, (2) can be  
sold b y  mail, (3) can be carried b y  route 
salesmen in small trucks, or (4) need be  (or 
need not  be) sold through state-owned retail 
outlets. 
The list is literally endless, yet  within any 
one firm the necessary or desirable promo- 
tional restrictions are apparent to one who 
observes the marketing operation. One manu- 
facturer of small electrical appliances decided 
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to redefine his business as any product  with 
an electric cord at the end of it. But the 
resulting flow of product  ideas and proto- 
types revealed the folly of not  stipulating the 
promotional requirements, including trade 
channels, that any new electric product would 
have to meet.  
Inside vs. Outside Facilities 
Preparing a strategy statement provides the 
opportuni ty to decide whether  the firm will 
limit R & D facilities and personnel. Few 
operating functions are bet ter  than research in 
creeping expenses. Each new piece of equip- 
ment  requires operators and materials, and 
new operators inevitably require additional 
equipment.  Active in-house research and 
development programs legitimately require all 
of these things, and it is temptingly easy to be 
penny-wise and pound-foolish. 
Management is obligated to define the 
extent  of  the continuing activity; if the need 
for major R & D output  is to be sustained, the 
expansion of in-house facilities is not  only 
justified but  mandated.  If R & D expansion is 
not possible or desirable, the strategy must 
allow for this condition. 
Competitive Situations To Be Sought or 
Avoided 
One classification of caveats that is inevitably 
present in a new product  situation, yet  just as 
often goes unstated, consists of competitive 
circumstances in markets being evaluated. 
Unless clarified they can be tragically dis- 
appointing. 
One company dealing in several toiletries 
lines rejected numerous reasonably good ideas 
over a two year period before someone 
realized what the ideas had in common:  all 
would have pushed the firm into direct 
confrontat ion with P & G's important  areas. 
This undisclosed criterion was so basic as to 
be of strategic meaningfulness, yet  it was not 
included in the policy. The omission was 
promptly corrected; although some firm 
members probably winced, the statement was 
necessary in order to save a great deal of time 
in fruitless work. Most frequently,  this type 
of provision is directed against any market  
which has one dominant  leader. In contrast, 
at least one company deliberately seeks out 
such situations, figuring to catch a fat, 
complacent competi tor  getting careless. 
Some markets are said to have deterior- 
ated and, therefore, are to be avoided. 
Perhaps technology is simple and entry is 
easy-cut - throa t  pricing is likely to have 
ruined the market.  Or perhaps competitive 
enthusiasm got out of hand and tactics exceed 
the bounds of propriety. 
In contrast to these and other exclusion 
guides, competitive conditions can also be 
used to define outstanding areas of oppor- 
tunity. One drug company made a tally of 
innovations in each of the industry's product 
categories, seeking as deliberate strategy any 
in which there had been no significant new 
product  activity for five years. A relatively 
modest  innovation in one such market was 
highly profitable. 
For any company there are good competi- 
tive situations and there are bad ones. 
Depending upon their strategic value, situ- 
ations should be so designated. 
Production Requirements 
In those rare cases when production require- 
ments are omitted from strategy, they soon 
get incorporated. The company,  for example, 
which expands to new facilities commonly  
builds beyond its present needs and then 
promptly undertakes a search for new 
products to manufacture.  Or equipment may 
be unique in some way--such as continuous 
liquid processing, or package filling, or 
delicate hand assemblies--giving greater value 
to new items which capitalize on them. One 
firm simply states that it wants products that 
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can be mass produced. But, however stated, 
applicable restrictions should be known. 
Patent Requirements 
The small New England firm which developed 
and marketed Lestoil would no doubt  have 
welcomed patent protection for it, but  the 
absence of a patent didn't  stop them. As 
desirable as a patent is, small firms can take 
the nonpatent  gamble; their investments are 
small, and they hope they have a product  so 
good that the big boys muscle in. 
Large firms feel quite differently; some go 
so far as to deny development funds for any 
idea which has poor patent probability. 
Others look beyond patents and stipulate 
whatever level of protection is desirable. 
Speed 
Product development is a long-term proposi- 
tion, and most companies recognize the 
futility and costliness of hurrying things up. 
There are instances, however, when manage- 
ments place a priority on immediacy and are 
willing to take the enormous risks associated 
with such situations. They can be said to have 
a short-term time dimension on their new- 
product value system. Professional baseball 
managers do exactly the same thing when 
they pick up a twelve-year veteran relief 
pitcher during a pennant drive rather than 
draft a seventeen-year-old from the farm 
system. Some firms are in "pennant drives," 
some are "rebuilding," and some are doing 
neither. The strategy implications are obvious. 
Risk/Failure Factors 
Campbell Soup Company may have changed 
subsequently, but  in 1966 its Product Adver- 
tising Manager said, " . . .  uppermost in our 
new products marketing philosophy--avoid 
failure! s Feelings differ widely on this point, 
ranging from the Campbell position (which 
may be temporary or standing) to the 
completely opposite strategy in which the 
firm accepts the inevitability of failure on 
new products. The latter approaches the 
market frequently and fails frequently, but, if 
development and market launch expenses are 
modest, one success out of every three 
attempts can be highly profitable. This 
strategy works best, however, when the chief 
marketing effort is advertising, since frequent 
new product failures play havoc with sales 
force morale and customer confidence. 
Occasionally the failure factor is func- 
tional, not  total. A firm may want to avoid 
production hazards or may feel ill-equipped 
to undertake technically complex quality 
control procedures. As Bon Vivant found, an 
outbreak of  botulism can threaten a firm's 
existence. At least one management has gone 
on record as wanting no part in transporting 
explosive materials. 
Pay-Back Conditions 
Most firms' financial conditions change from 
time to time, from periods of cash prosperity 
to periods of cash constringency, yet, the 
many people involved down the line in new 
product development are rarely informed of 
these conditions. Only when some particular 
idea or completed product is rejected because 
of the excessive cash drain it would impose 
(for outside technical development, patent 
purchase, or introductory advertising) or its 
slow pay-back are R & D people aware of the 
overall financial situation. 
No one suggests that the new product 
program should shift gears with every turn of 
the company's financial condition. But the 
product development strategy does have the 
flexibility to absorb some of the setbacks. 
Ironically, the development departments of 
high-prestige firms often harbor a few product 
8. Speech by John  W. Dodd, Jr. 
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ideas that are idle for lack of glamour bu t  
which can generate cash for a short-term. Of 
course the converse set of circumstances also 
exists. 
Minimum Sales 
Although it applies only to those situations 
where a sizeable fixed expense commitment  
attaches to the new product,  it nevertheless is 
not too uncommon to hear management talk 
of a minimum dollar sales criterion. One 
industry in which this reality must be recog- 
nized is ethical drugs; there each new item is 
usually detailed to doctors and hospitals at 
least once. Every drug firm, then, can 
estimate the share of fixed costs entailed in 
the initial sales approach and pret ty quickly 
come up with the minimum level of sales 
necessary to support  it. One large midwestern 
pharmaceutical company uses two million 
dollars as their minimum. This is profitable 
strategy because, if volume is expected to be 
significantly less than this, the detailing effort  
should not  be pulled off established products.  
Need for Basic Research 
Basic research is enormously expensive while 
making no promises. Most firms avoid it by  
including in their strategy statement a pro- 
vision stipulating the immediate rejection of 
any idea which necessitates it. Even those 
firms with research programs addressed to 
significant knowledge breakthroughs are wise 
to ask the basic research question--Are such 
ideas desirable?-as  a matter  of  course, now 
and then. 
Using a procedure which I suspect is 
rather common,  one electronics firm 
announced to all concerned personnel that 
basic programs had been carefully selected 
and adequately funded; these were to 
comprise the company 's  total research in the 
speculative unknown.  All other new product  
ideas were to be rejected if they called for 
basic efforts. This may seem arbitrary, as may 
most of the stipulations in a strategy state- 
ment; it is in the sense of out-of-hand 
rejection. The limitations should be based, 
however, on a careful appraisal of research 
opportunities;  thus, they are not  arbitrary in 
the sense of casual or flippant. Research 
design is a gamble, as is all strategy; any 
resource commitment  decision necessarily 
rejects certain alternatives. (The criticisms of  
this aspect of new product  strategy are 
considered later.) 
Thousands of small manufacturing firms 
exist outside the range of inventiveness by 
simply making something that others have 
created and selling it at a lower price. This is 
not the strategy of innovative imitation. 
There is nothing innovative about  it. These 
firms opt for Me-Too as a total strategy. It is 
common,  however, to find other manage- 
ments rejecting the identical product  
approach. As one president said, "Unless it's 
an important part of a line which we must 
have, we hold up on duplicates until we can 
significantly improve upon them."  
Other restrictions on competitive position- 
ing run the full range: no product  price can 
increase more than 20 percent,  no product  
can require significantly more service, no 
product  can be larger, longer, hotter,  deeper. 
If  these things matter,  tell people about  it. 
Product/Service Relatedness 
Increasingly these days, firms are relating 
their products to systems of  use or service. 
One small midwestern instruments manu- 
facturer decided that his analog and digital 
computers could best  be sold as parts of total 
measuring and control systems, so he immedi- 
ately ordered a halt to every development 
project whose output  would not fit this 
concept. Other firms have decided that service 
is their best chance of  differentiation and so 
seek products with a high service commit- 
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Miscellaneous 
There  is ac tua l ly  no  end  to  the  possibil i t ies,  as 
the fo l lowing migh t  a t tes t :  
1. Products which offset a sales or production 
seasonality problem. 
2. Products which utilize some particular raw 
material, one common to that now used, 
common to that of a sister division, or 
incorporating a by-product or even waste 
material. 
3. Products to fill gaps in sales calls, such as 
when a high volume product leads to calls 
upon a given customer group for which the 
firm has no other products. New items could 
capitalize on the wasted (free) selling time. 
4. Products which capitalize on a given technical 
skill, such as the Corning Glass strategy that 
new items should exploit the firm's excellent 
glass technology. 
5. Products which avoid certain types of 
markets, such as the drug firm whose exec- 
utives recoiled from marketing rectal medi- 
cations. 
6. Coca-Cola wants new products which exploit 
its outstanding distribution system. 
7. Hertz wants products to rent. 
8. Warner-Lambert wants products which can be 
mass-marketed. 
The Knock of Opportunity 
Several ob jec t ions  have b e e n  raised against  the  
prac t ice  o f  new p r o d u c t  s t ra tegy  s t a t ement s .  
S o m e  critics po in t  ou t  the  d i f f icu l ty  of  
coord ina t ing  an assessment  o f  m a r k e t  oppor -  
tuni t ies  w i th  the  c o m p a n y  resources  and the  
t ime  involved as obstacles .  Others  cite the  
b o o k s h e l f  fa te  o f  m a n y  s t ra tegy  s t a t emen t s .  
Bu t  these  c o n c e m s  are m o r e  than  o f f se t  b y  
the r educ t ion  in was t ed  p rog rams  and false 
starts ,  the  enhanced  mora l e  wh ich  comes  to  
an o rgan iza t ion  t ha t  is w o r k i n g  toge ther ,  and 
the  degree  o f  manager ia l  con t ro l  tha t  good  
s t ra tegy  permi t s .  By  clar i fying ass ignments ,  
m a n a g e m e n t  main ta ins  con t ro l .  S t ra tegy  
organizes the  t hough t s  of  the  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  
provides  ra t ionale  for  decis ion mode l s ,  and 
a f fords  the  specif ic  and  deta i led  cr i ter ia  b y  
which  all new ideas are u l t ima te ly  evaluated .  
T h e  one  o the r  m a j o r  cri t icism, and  the 
on ly  real ly  serious one,  is tha t  a t h o r o u g h  
s t a t e m e n t  of  new p r o d u c t  d e v e l o p m e n t  
s t ra tegy  is inhib i t ing  and  restr ict ive.  
Supposed ly ,  creat ive peop l e  c a n n o t  func t ion  
unde r  such  rest ra ints ;  ideas wi th  great  p o t en -  
tial are re jec ted  because  peop le  w h o  execu te  
s t ra tegy  lack the  b r o a d  vision and  f lexibi l i ty  
of  those  w h o  set it. 
Crit ics w h o  take  this pos i t i on  do n o t  lack 
for  examples .  T h e y  po in t  ou t  tha t  no  s t ra tegy  
could  or should  have con ta ined  T h o m a s  
Edison .  Or,  h o w  m a n y  s t ra tegy  s t a t emen t s  
w o u l d  have re jec ted  the  xe rograph ic  process  
or  Dr.  Land ' s  camera .  H o w  m a n y  t imes every 
day  do  researchers  in var ious labora tor ies  
a round  the  c o u n t r y  gl impse the  rough  out l ine  
of  a t ru ly  great  idea on ly  to  re ject  it immedi -  
a te ly  as falling outs ide  the  f i rm ' s  scope  of  
in teres t?  
No  one  knows ,  o f  course,  b u t  i t ' s  a lot  less 
o f t en  t h a n  the  ques t ion  implies ,  for  several  
reasons:  
1. Most people have adequate range within the 
strategy--they don't want for stretching room 
and are so busy within their range that they 
are not tempted by "glimpses" outside of it. 
2. Most ideas inhibited by strategy should be 
inhibited. One role for new product strategy is 
to stipulate those areas where the firm's 
researchers are most likely to find good ideas, 
based on the fertility of different fields, 
researchers' capabilities, and the firm's ability 
to capitalize on different types of ideas. By 
definition then, other fields are most apt to 
yield only fool's gold. 
3. Finally, strategy serves the policy function of 
a guideline, not a prison wall. Most researchers 
who are capable of having really great ideas 
know this and are not adverse to requesting an 
exception. By this means, the issues of 
strategy interpretation and strategy change are 
regularly reviewed; an ongoing evaluation 
process by those who set the strategy is forced 
by the appearance of an idea or market change 
which has survived the first-line challenge of 
established guidelines before it became an 
issue for mandating change. 
L ike  any  o the r  po l i cy ,  new p r o d u c t  
s t ra tegy  opera tes  wi th  t w o  as sumpt ions .  The  
first one  is t ha t  there  will b e  mis takes ,  such as 
the  re jec t ion  o f  g o o d  ideas,  b u t  these errors  
are m o r e  t han  c o m p e n s a t e d  b y  the  savings o f  
the  t ime  and  e f fo r t  no t  spent  on  inappro-  
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priate ideas. Besides, who really knows 
whether good ideas are rejected? It is claimed, 
for example, that several top companies, 
including Kodak, rejected the xerographic 
concept. It was worth a fortune to those who 
later made it successful, but  who is to say it 
would have been equally successful for one of 
the established firms? The odds against a 
Xerox must be in the million to one category, 
making it quite appropriate for a venture 
capital situation, but far outside most new 
product strategies. 
It seems safe to hazard an opinion that 
more money has been lost developing bad 
ideas w i t h i n  the strategy than by rejecting 
good ideas o u t s i d e  the strategy. 
The second assumption is that the cost of 
dealing with highly repetitive, though slightly 
dissimilar, situations is substantially reduced 
by means of policy guidelines which permit 
the delegation of decisions. Without strategy, 
new product ideas are initially evaluated by 
persons who, guessing about top management 
desires, will be more conservative and restric- 
tive than if they had strategy guidelines, or by 
top management itself. Eccentric researchers 
who object to the restraints of strategy like 
the latter, but,  for evident reasons, manage- 
ment does not. The only exceptions arise in 
the cases of the really inventive researchers, 
the Edisons; these necessitate special handling 
via independent, separately budgeted research 
centers or via some other technique which 
separates them from the group restrained by 
strategy. 
The claim advanced in this article is 
that new product development so 
engulfs an entire organization and is so crucial 
to its long-term success that its skillful inte- 
gration into the company operation requires a 
guiding strategy: the selection of goals and 
the purposeful arrangement of resources 
dedicated to the achievement of those goals. 
When based upon overall corporate goals and 
an objective evaluation of company strengths 
and skills, a new product strategy statement 
can provide effective and uniform guidance to 
the many persons in the various places who 
participate in the product development 
process. 
The fact is, middle managers and staff 
specialists cannot function without  strategy; 
if they are not given a policy for new 
products, they will promptly make up one. It 
will be based on their individual perceptions 
of what management wants and will be 
heavily influenced by what they think 
management s h o u l d  want. 
Not long ago the president of a company 
was telling me how important  a certain area 
of recent diversification was. Later that same 
week a key research manager in the same firm 
cited the difficulties in that area as reasons 
why it should be permitted to "coo l"  for a 
while, if not  permanently.  Only the naive 
believe that close working relationships 
prevent misunderstandings like this. 
Proof can come from a poll if your firm 
does not yet  have a well-understood new 
product strategy in writing. And proof is a 
must for those managers who sincerely believe 
their new product programs are highly coordi- 
nated without  a statement of strategy. Ask 
the firm's or division's key people the 
following questions: 
1. How big, in dollar volume, do you think we 
will be in ten years? 
2. Which three of our important product cate- 
gories will have declined significantly in 
importance? 
3. Name two product or market categories which 
you think would be good for the firm but 
which we are not involved with now in any 
way. 
4. Acquisition is: (1) terribly important, (2) 
important, (3) not really important to this 
firm for the next ten years. 
5. Most important in holding us back from more 
and better new products is: (1) We're short on 
good new product ideas, or (2) we're not good 
enough at converting ideas into successful 
products. 
6. Name the two resources, assets, or skills which 
we have which are the most important in our 
overall new product activity. Is this pair the 
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7. For researchers: what two skills or tools have 
been most valuable in the firm's marketing 
successes? For marketers: what two attributes 
or skills have been most valuable to the firm's 
technical research and development program? 
8. What policy guides our response to successful 
innovation in our markets by other firms? 
Readers  can th ink  of  m a n y  m o r e  ques t ions ,  
b u t  wha teve r  the quest ions ,  a poll  like this 
can be qui te  revealing. 
The  coverage  and d e p t h  of  detai l  tha t  
should  be  in a new p r o d u c t  s t ra tegy  s t a t e m e n t  
is an o p e n  variable.  J a m e s  Geier  of  Cincinnat i  
Mi lacron  m a y  have covered enough  bases 
w h e n  he said recen t ly ,  " T h e  name  of  the 
game is s taying No.  1 in t echno logy .  ' '9 On  
the  o the r  hand,  a pha rmaceu t i ca l  manu-  
fac turer  t o o k  six t y p e d  pages to spell ou t  
some  twen ty - seven  criteria.  The  a p p r o a c h  
depends  on the c o m p l e x i t y  of  the  f i rm ' s  
9. "A Machine Maker With Optimism," Business Week 
(Nov. 20, 1971), p. 46. 
business ( n u m b e r  of  op t ions)  and the  diffi- 
culties of  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .  M a n a g e m e n t  can 
c o m m e n c e  wi th  a succinct  s t a t e m e n t  and add 
coverage as needed.  
F o r t u n a t e l y ,  the process  of  deve lop ing  
s t ra tegy for  new p r o d u c t s  is no t  s ignif icant ly  
d i f fe ren t  f rom deve lop ing  any  o the r  s t ra tegy.  
Since the app rop r i a t e  generic process  for  
s t ra tegy d e t e r m i n a t i o n  is b e c o m i n g  k n o w n ,  
there  is no  need  to s ta te  it here.  A new b o o k  
b y  K e n n e t h  R.  Andrews  offers  superb  insight 
on this m a t t e r  and discusses in dep th  the 
s tep-by-s tep  process .  10 
But  the task is demand ing .  In  m o s t  f i rms 
t o d a y ,  new p r o d u c t s  are essent ial  to con- 
t inued success, so the  s t ra tegy  had  b e t t e r  be  a 
good  one.  A n d  if m a n a g e m e n t  is to avoid 
was ted  e f for t ,  false starts,  confus ion ,  low 
mora le ,  and even rebel l ion,  it mus t  e f fec t ive ly  
c o m m u n i c a t e  this s t ra tegy  to all involved.  
10. Kenneth R. Andrews, The Concept of Corporate 
Strategy (Homewood, Ill.: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1971 ). 
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